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IAGPA-F-SD

27 Nov 84

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: CENTER LANE Discussion with INSCOM Command Group -  
20-21 Nov 84 (U)

1. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) On 19 November 1984, I requested an appointment with the Chief of Staff to discuss CENTER LANE (CL) developments after a series of meetings at DIA earlier that day. My primary objective was to notify the INSCOM Command Group that the CL transfer to DIA most likely would not occur before 31 December 1984, and that DIA planned to request a detailing of INSCOM personnel rather than a PCS.

2. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) On 20 November 1984, from 1100-1140 hours, I met with COL Kirk and LTC Johnson to inform them of recent CL developments and covered the following topics.

SG1J

a. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) A summary of my meetings at DIA on 19 November 1984, and the fact that DIA had a copy of the ACSI 4 October 1984 letter to the CG, INSCOM that authorized detailing if desired. Either LTG Williams or [REDACTED] would call the CG with that request. A copy of the outcome those meetings is attached as Incl 1.

b. (S/CL02/NOFORN) The CL transfer to DIA would not take place by 31 December 1984 as planned because of a need for DIA to notify Congress of the action. There simply was not enough time to accomplish the letter writing campaign. Additionally, I provided an explanation as to why the transfer would not be accomplished on time.

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c. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) Detailing of CL assets to DIA would work, although it would not meet the CG's objectives of "getting INSCOM out of the business." I stated that I did not understand the CG's concerns about "something" going wrong," but I tried to convey the thought that risk was minimal. During the discussion on risk, I added that there would always be some risk because of the Great Skill (GS) asset and a continued association with ASD because of the DASR. An additional risk would be incurred because INSCOM would continue to be a CL follow on "customer" and an association between an intelligence agency and a psychoenergetic collection activity would carry some risk.

COL Kirk accepted the problem, understood its complexity, and determined it was time for me to brief MG Soyster on the developments. An appointment was made for 211030 Nov 84. It was COL Kirk's position that he would approve the detailing, but he was not sure of the CG's position. He stated he would alert the CG as to the purpose of the meeting.

3. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) On 21 November 1984 from 1050-1135 hours, I met with MG Soyster to brief him on recent CL transfer developments. The basis of the discussion was the talking paper at Incl 2. I covered the following points.

SG1J

a. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) DIA management had a copy of the ACSI 4 Oct 84 MOA approval letter, and they planned to move for a detailing action rather than a PCS. LTG Williams or [REDACTED] would telephonically contact MG Soyster in the near future to discuss the issue.

b. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) DIA saw a requirement to notify Congress of the CL detailing/transfer. The notification process and return reply from Congress would not be completed by 31 December 1984, and the transfer/detailing could not take place until the notification process had been completed. That could delay the transfer until April 1985. I provided the rationale for the Congressional notification which MG Soyster acknowledged.

c. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) The pros and cons of detailing/PCSing were presented. I recommended the detailing option because it protected the personnel better, and permitted the resumption of the CL collection effort on a timely basis. In support of my recommendation, I downplayed the number of INSCOM spaces that would have to be "gapped". CL has seven military spaces, one of which is a GS officer. One officer is scheduled to PCS in June 85, so therefore there are only five spaces to be "gapped". I cleared up the misconception that INSCOM would have to provide a replacement for the June 1985 loss. I stated that detailing would mean indirect INSCOM involvement with psychoenergetics until December 1985.

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d. (S/CL-2/NOFORN) If MG Soyster accepted the detailing proposal, I would rewrite the MOA to protect INSCOM's interests so that full responsibility for CL operations would rest with DIA. I further recommended that if he approves detailing that he consider reaching an agreement to place CL in VO.

MG Soyster did not rule out detailing and said that if he did not receive a call from DIA soon, he would call [REDACTED] for an update. He reiterated his position of support for the CL technique. However, he did not desire to "keep footing the bill." MG Soyster directed the preparation of a letter that would notify ACSI of the delay.

SG1J

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as



BRIAN BUZBY  
LTC, MI  
CENTER LANE Project Manager

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